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Abs tract  
Objectives. To evaluate whether greater xperience and success with performance 
incentives among physician practices is related to increased participation in Medicare’s 
voluntary value-based payment reforms. 
 
Data sources / s tudy se tting. Publicly available data from Medicare’s Physician 
Compare (n=1,278; January 2012 to November 2013) and nationally representative 
physician practice data from the National Survey of Physician Organizations 3 (NSPO3) 
(n=907,538; 2013). 
 
Study des ign . We used regression analysis to examine practice-lev l relationships 
between prior exposure to performance incentives and participation in key Medicare 
value-based payment reforms: accountable care organization (ACO) programs, the 
Physician Quality Reporting System (“Physician Compare”), and the Meaningful Use of 
Health Information Technology program (“Meaningful Use”). Prior experience and 
success with financial incentives was measured as: 1) the percentage of practices’ 
revenue from financial incentives for quality or efficiency; and 2) practices’ exposure to 
public reporting of quality measures. 
 
Data co llection / extraction  m ethods . We linked physician participation data from 
Medicare’s Physician Compare to the NSPO3 survey. 
 
Principal find ings . There was wide variation in practices’ xposure to performance 
incentives, with 64% exposed to financial incentives, 45% exposed to public reporting, 
and 2.2% of practice revenue coming from financial incentives.  For each percentage-
point increase in financial incentives, there was a 0 .90 percentage-point increase in the 
probability of participating in ACOs (Standard Error [SE], 0 .01, p<0.001) and a 0 .80 
percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in Meaningful Use (SE, 
0 .010, p<0.001), controlling for practice characteristics. Financial incentives were not 
associated with participation in Physician Compare. Among ACO participants, a one 
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increase in the probability of being “very well” prepared to utilize cost and quality data 
(SE, 0 .001, p<0.001). 
 
Conclus ions. Physicians organizations’ prior experience and success with performance 
incentives was related to participation in Medicare ACO arrangements and participation 
in the meaningful use criteria but not to participation in Physician Compare. We 
conclude that Medicare must complement financial incentives with additional efforts to 
address the needs of practices with less experience with such incentives to promote 
value-based payment on a broader scale. 
 
Key w o rds : Financial incentives, Medicare, accountable care organizations, value-
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In troduction  
In April 2015, President Obama signed the Medicare Access and Children's Health 
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (MACRA), permanently repealing Medicare’s 
sustainable growth rate formula for physician payment and replacing it with a new 
value-based system, the Quality Payment Program (QPP). Beginning in 2019, all 
physicians who participate in Medicare will elect to join one of two value-based 
pathways: (1) the Alternative Payment Model (APM) program, for physicians who 
provide substantial care via accountable care organizations (ACOs) and other alternative 
models with two-sided risk arrangements or (2) the Merit-Based Incentive Payment 
System (MIPS), for those who continue to be compensated primarily via fee-for-service. 
To entice physicians to join APMs, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) will award APM participants an unconditional 5% incentive payment between 
2019 and 2024, and, from 2026 onwards, a permanently higher fee schedule growth 
rate (0 .75% per year) than MIPS (0 .25% per year). Providers remaining in fee-for-
service will default into MIPS, which consolidates three existing programs: the 
Physician Quality Reporting System (“Physician Compare”), the Physician Value-Based 
Payment Modifier, and the Electronic Health Records Incentive Program (“Meaningful 
Use”). The MIPS offers no unconditional bonus and i stead adjusts payments according 
to measures of quality, resource use, meaningful use, and clinical practice improvement 
activities. Variation in MIPS payments promises to be large, with maximum payment 
adjustments growing each year from 4% (in 2019) to 9% (in 2022). 
 
MACRA will soon confront all Medicare physicians with a stark choice: To remain 
behind in a previously familiar fee-for-service world and accept the uncertain, risky 
payment adjustments of the MIPS or to instead select the guaranteed bonuses of the 
otherwise uncharted APMs. The short-term benefits of APMs are intended to move 
physicians toward the more comprehensive payment reforms. Yet it is not clear that 
physicians with limited experience or success with value-based payment will be willing 
or able to make such a leap toward APMs, particularly by the QPP’s launch. Given the 
ultimately voluntary nature of the programs upon which it rests, a clearer 
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particular, it is not known how past experience with pay-for-performance or public 
reporting will influence physician participation in Medicare’s current value-based 
reforms. 
 
To better understand this fast-approaching decision point, we investigate three of the 
principal initiatives that will form the foundation of MACRA: Medicare ACOs, 
Meaningful Use, and Physician Compare. Specifically, we seek to answer the following 
three questions. First, in the current environment, is prior exposure to financial 
incentives related to physicians’ participation in ACOs, Physician Compare, or 
Meaningful Use? Second, is prior exposure to public reporting relatd o physicians’ 
participation in ACOs, Physician Compare, or Meaningful Use? Third, among those 
practices that have applied to become a Medicare ACO, is exposure to performance 
incentives related to preparedness to succeed as an ACO? 
 
Co n cep t u a l fr a m ew o r k   
 
We conceptualize physicians as economic actors whose decisions regarding voluntary 
participation in Medicare reforms are shaped by a mix of motivations, including short- 
and long-run profit, tolerance for risk, financial capital and other organizational 
capabilities or limitations, and perceived benefit to care delivery and patient health 
(Conrad 2015; Kao 2015). In this framework, there are several mechanisms by which 
practices with greater exposure to and success with financial incentives will participate 
at higher rates in value-based reforms. Succeeding as an ACO requires bearing risk, 
aligning financial incentives, developing robust health information technology (IT) 
infrastructure, and managing patient populations across the continuum of care –  
capacities that many practices lack and whose development requires time, capital 
investments, and structural changes (Lewis et al. 2013; Shortell et al. 2014). For those 
practices focused on maximizing near-term payoffs, we anticipate experience and 
success with financial incentives for quality or efficiency to increase their willingness to
participate in Medicare reforms (Kantarevic and Kralj 2013). To the degree that 
physicians self-select into contracts containing greater financial incentives or public 
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to patient health, we expect a similarly positive relationship with reform participation. 
We anticipate such relationships to be particularly strong for practice participation in 
ACOs in light of the barriers to entry and financial risk that accompany population 
health management. And because practices cannot simply form an ACO but m st find 
willing partners with which to contract, practices with greater risk experience may be 
viewed by emerging ACOs as more capable and preferentially selected for inclusion in 
those ACOs. 
 
Our analysis centers on the effects offinancial incentives and public reporting because 
these two influences – money and information –  constitute the primary levers available 
to policy makers seeking to strengthen participation in value-based reforms (Glied 
2015). We nonetheless recognize that many other practice and patient factors hape 
practice participation decisions. A robust health IT infrastructure is essential for 
measuring and reporting performance, tracking population health, and coordinating 
care (Bardach et al. 2013; Burton, Anderson, and Kues 2004). Because achieving 
spending and quality goals will likely require that practices greatly improve patient 
engagement and activation, practices with greater patient-centered culture may be more 
likely to participate in value-based reforms (Cosgrove et al. 2013; Shortell et al. 2015). 
Experience with managed care, like with financial incentives for quality and efficiency, 
can both reflect and reinforce a practice’s capacity and preference to bear risk and 
manage populations of patient. At the same time, a physician that does not contract with 
an HMO may join an ACO in order to more effectively compete with HMOs (Frech III et 
al. 2015), rendering the net relationship theoretically ambiguous. We are similarly 
uncertain about the effects of practice ownership by a hospital, particularly regarding 
ACO participation: while hospitals can offer considerable capital needed to invest in 
reporting systems and population management (improving participation in Physician 
Compare and Meaningful Use), achieving ACO spending reductions will require 
redirecting patient flow toward less expensive care settings and away from hospitals –  a 
volume reduction unlikely to be fully offset by ACO bonuses. Finally, practices serving 
disadvantaged patients may be less likely to participate in value-based reforms because 
they are: (1) unprepared to join –  due to fewer resources for value improvement 
















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
due to historically worse pay-for-performance outcomes among safety-net providers 
(Markovitz and Ryan 2016); or (3) unable to join –  because merging ACOs 




Study Data and Methods 
Data Sources  and Study Sam ple . We used data on physician practices from the 
third National Survey of Physician Organizations (NSPO3) 3. The NSPO3 is a nationally 
representative survey of U.S. physician practices that was administered to practice 
leaders between January 2012 and November 2013 (1,398 responses for a response rate 
of 49.7%) (Shortell et al. 2014). We used NSPO3 data o measure organizational 
characteristics and ACO participation (n=1,278) and ACO preparedness (n=259). To 
measure Physician Compare and Meaningful Use participation, we linked NSPO3 
practices (n=1,192) to Medicare’s 2013 Physician Compare National Provider-L vel 
National File (n= 907,538). We excluded practices with missing information on eith r 
performance incentives or organizational characterisics (see Figure S1 for CONSORT 
flow diagram). The methods used to link the practice survey data to participation in 
value-based reforms are described in the Supplement. 
 
Measuring Participation  in  Medicare ’s  Value-Based Re fo rm s . Our three main 
study outcomes were ACO participation, Physician Compare participation, and 
Meaningful Use participation. We measured participation in Physician Compare or 
Meaningful Use as the percentage of a practice’s physicians that were listed on Physician 
Compare as participating in calendar year 2013. We used NSPO3 survey questions to 
assess (1) ACO participation (whether the practice had applied to CMS to become an 
ACO in 2012) and (2) ACO preparedness to (a) implement Meaningful Use and (b) 
collect, analyze, and report cost and quality measure  required by Medicare. Please see 
Table S1 for survey instruments and variable operationalization. 
 
Measuring Financial Incen tives, Public Repo rting, and Organ izational 
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reporting, and organizational characteristics in Table S1. We created a measure of 
practice exposure to financial incentives by summing together two NSPO3 measures: (1) 
percentage of past-year revenue from bonuses for clinical quality, patient satisfaction 
and use of information technology and (2) percentage of past-year revenue from bonus 
for efficient utilization of resources. We measured exposure to public reporting using a 
binary NSPO3 measure of whether data on clinical quality of care are publicly reported 
by health plans or other external entities. We controlled for practice characteristics that 
we hypothesized would be related to practice participation in value-based reforms. 
These included a health IT index, a patient-centered culture index, as well as practice 
ownership, size, and type (see Table S1 for index details). We also included three 
measures of a practice’s patient demographics: percentage of patients with limited 
English proficiency; percentage of patients who were black; and share of venue from 
different payers (Medicare, Medicaid, commercial, uninsured). 
 
Statis tical Analys is. We used multivariate regression analysis to examine practice-
level relationships between prior exposure to either financial incentives or public 
reporting and participation in Medicare’s value-based reforms. We used linear models 
for our two continuous outcomes (participation in Physician Compare and Meaningful 
Use) and probit models for our binary outcome (participation in ACOs), adjusting for 
the practice characteristics and patient factors described above. We express the results 
as average marginal effects. These represent the absolute percentage point change in a 
practice’s probability of participation given a one-unit increase in each independent 
variable and holding all other covariates at their observed values in the sample. We also 
estimated ordered probit models to analyze the relationship between incentives and 
ACO preparedness. 
 
To assess the sensitivity of our results across model specifications, we specified two 
alternative models of the relationship between financi l incentives and ACO 
participation. First, because the percent of revenue from financial incentives could 
reflect either experience or success with value-based payment programs, we created an 
index of any exposure to financial incentives measuring whether practices received any 
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(no=0, yes=1) (see Table S1). Second, to evaluate the influence on our estimates of 
financial incentive outliers (the four percent of practices with at least 20 percent of 
revenue from financial incentives, many of whom may also participate in ACOs), we 
estimated probit models excluding those outlier practices and compared the estimates 
to those derived from the full sample of practices. Finally, we evaluated whether the 
effects of financial incentives varied across key organizational characteristics (described 
in Supplement). Weights provided by NSPO3 were used in all analyses so that our 
results and inferences can be generalized to US physician practices nationally. We 
specified Huber-White standard errors to be robust to heteroskedasticity and performed 




Perfo rm ance  incen tives  and participation  in  Medicare ’s  value-based 
re fo rm s. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the practice-level variables used in the 
analysis. 46% and 22% of practices reported some exposure to financial incentives for 
quality and efficiency, respectively, while 45% of practices had experienced public 
reporting. There was relatively wide variation in practices’ exposure to financial 
incentives, with 2.2% (standard deviation of 7.0%) of practice revenue linked to 
financial incentives for quality or efficiency (Table 1, Figure S2). 15% of practices had 
applied to participate in Medicare ACOs, while 48% of practices’ physicians participated 
in Medicare’s Physician Compare and Meaningful Use programs. Practices that applied 
to Medicare ACOs reported varying levels of preparedness, with the modal practice 
“somewhat” prepared to collect, analyze, and report on those cost and quality 
performance measures required by Medicare and “very well” prepared to implement 
Meaningful Use. Participation in ACOs was weakly correlated with participation in 
either Physician Compare (Pearson’s r=0.17) or Meaningful Use (r=0.14) (Table 2). 
Participation in Physician Compare and Meaningful Use, meanwhile, demonstrated 
slightly greater correlation (r=0.37). 
 
Relationsh ip be tw een  financial incen tives  and participation  in  value-based 
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incentives (row 1) or public reporting (row 2) and participation in Medicare value-based 
programs. The average marginal effects are derived from either probit or linear 
regression analyses of the relationship between financial incentives and participation 
(see Table S2). This shows that a one percentage-point increase in the percent of 
revenue linked to financial incentives for quality or efficiency was associated with 
approximately a one percentage-point increase in the probability of ACO participation 
(Marginal Effect [ME], 0 .009, Standard Error [SE], 0 .001, p < 0 .001) and a one 
percentage-point increase in Meaningful Use participation (ME, 0 .008, SE, 0 .001, p < 
0 .001). This corresponds to a six percent increase in ACO participation and  two 
percent increase in Meaningful Use participation (Table S3). Financial incentives were 
not significantly related to Physician Compare participation (ME, 0 .000, SE, 0 .001, p = 
0 .918). 
 
In sensitivity analyses, any past exposure to financial incentives was significantly related 
to increased participation in ACOs (Table S4; ME, 0 .095, SE, 0 .008, p < 0 .001) but not 
Physician Compare (ME, 0 .021, SE, 0 .013, p = 0 .123) or Meaningful Use (ME, 0.006, 
SE, 0 .013, p = 0 .650). In our outlier analysis, we found that, among practices with less 
than 20 percent of revenue from financial incentives, a one percentage-point increase in 
financial incentives was related to a one-and-a-half percentage-point increase in the 
probability of ACO participation (Table S5; ME, 0 .015, SE, 0 .002, p < 0 .001), a 
significantly greater elationship than among the full sample of practices (change in 
regression coefficient, -0 .030, SE, 0 .008, p < 0 .001). 
 
Relationsh ip be tw een  public repo rting  and participation  in  value-based 
re fo rm s . Practices with prior exposure to public reporting were approximately four 
percentage points more likely to participate in ACOs (Table 2; ME, 0 .036, SE, 0 .014, p < 
0 .05), twelve percentage points more likely to participate in Physician Compare (ME, 
0 .120, SE, 0 .026, p< 0 .001), and fourteen percentage points more likely to participate 
in Meaningful Use (ME, 0 .136, SE, 0 .046, p< 0 .001). These average marginal effects 
correspond to increases of 24 percent, 25 percent, and 28 percent in the probability of 
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Relationsh ip be tw een  perfo rm ance  incen tives  and ACO preparedness. 
Among ACO participants, experience with either financial incentives (Regression 
Coefficient, 0 .032, SE, 0 .011, p < 0 .001) or public reporting (Regression Coefficient, 
0 .967, SE, 0 .162, p < 0 .001) was positively and significantly related to practices’ 
preparedness to collect, analyze, and report those cost and quality measures required by 
Medicare ACO contracts (Figure 1, Table S6). These effects appeared non-linear in both 
models, with financial incentives and public reporting incentives most strongly related 
to an increased probability of being “very well” prepared to utilize cost and quality data 
(Figures 1 and S4, Table S7). Experience with public reporting was also positively related 
to improved ACO preparedness to implement Meaningful Use, while financial incentives 
were not (Tables S6 and S7). 
 
Although participation in value-based reforms was independently related to 
organizational characteristics such as the health IT index, the patient-centered culture 
index, and revenue from HMOs (Table 2), heterogeneity analyses uncovered only 
limited evidence that organizational characteristics modified the relationship between 




Using a nationally representative survey of US physician practices, we found that greater 
prior exposure to performance incentives, including both financial incentives and public 
reporting, was strongly and significantly related to participation in Medicare ACOs and 
Meaningful Use. This pattern holds true even among those practices hat have applied to 
contract with ACOs, where experience with either financial incentives or public 
reporting was related to significantly improved preparedness to collect, analyze, and 
report on required cost and quality measures. Exposure to public reporting but not 
financial incentives was positively associated with participation in Medicare Physician 
Compare. 
 
These findings suggest that physicians with prior experience and success responding to 
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new value-based payment initiatives. On the other side are those physician practices 
with little to no prior exposure to value-based payments or public reporting who are not 
engaging in reforms at the same rate.  To encourage practice participation in APMs, 
Medicare will not only need to facilitate participation among incentive-savvy practices 
but also encourage and address the needs of those practices currently left behind by 
value-based payment reforms. 
 
Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with several different hypotheses about why 
practices join or abstain from value-based reforms, each suggesting a different set of 
potential policies. If our findings stem from practices seeking to minimize risk or 
maximize profit in the short-run, Medicare could motivate these practices to join ACOs 
by continuing to offer one-sided risk ACOs (i.e., shared savings but not shared losses) or 
by rewarding improvements over time, in addition to achievement. Given previous 
findings that capital constitutes a major barrier to physician leaders initiating an ACO 
(Colla et al. 2014), it also possible that our results reflect capital constraints or other 
infrastructural barriers.  If this were the case, Medicare’s Transforming Clinical Practice 
Initiative, which will provide $685 million in technical assistance to thirty-nine 
collaborative health care networks representing 140,00  physicians, represents an 
important step forward in encouraging greater participation (Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services 2015). 
 
On the other hand, if our results reflect physicians’ idiosyncratic preferences regarding 
care delivery or perceived benefit to patient health, Medicare will need to address and 
alleviate concerns held by physicians that have historically opted-out of these reforms. 
In this scenario, improving participation in value-based reforms will likely require 
simultaneous efforts to promote physician support among late-adopters for Physician 
Compare and other historically unpopular programs (Berenson and Kaye 2013; 
Berenson and Rice 2015). Medicare could use some of the $15 million per year set aside 
by MACRA for measure development through 2018 to more effectively involve 
physicians and specialty societies in developing, implementing, and evaluating both the 
measures and the payment design itself (McClellan 2015; Roland and Dudley 2015). 
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reflect societal priorities, not physicians’, focusing particular attention on cost-
effectiveness and socioeconomic disparities (Morden et al. 2014; Ryan 2013; Selby, 
Forsythe, and Sox 2015). 
 
At the same time, physicians joining the two-sided risk models of MACRA APMs will 
likely require very different type of assistance than those joining the MIPS. This 
possibility is underscored by our finding that participation in Medicare ACOs, the basis 
for the APM track, is only weakly correlated with participation in either Physician 
Compare or Meaningful Use, which form the foundation for the MIPS track. Similarly, 
experience with value-based payment may also reflect or confer capacities that are 
distinct from those required by public reporting. Experience with financial incentives 
was significantly related to participation in ACOs, which primarily utilize financial risk 
to motivate physician behavior, but not Physician Compare, historically a pay-for-
reporting program. Conversely, public reporting was more strongly related to Physician 
Compare than ACO participation. 
 
Our study has a number of limitations.  First, the cross-sectional study design limits 
causal inference. A practice’s decision to enter public reporting or pay-for-performance 
programs may be a signal of practices’ unmeasured interests or capabilities that could 
also be correlated with participation in value-based reforms. While reverse-causality 
could also bias our results (i.e., increased program participation increases practices' 
exposure to financial incentives), we consider this is unlikely for several reasons (1) 
respondents were asked about past-year experience and preceded the start of the ACO 
“payment year” (i.e., when ACO incentives would affect practice revenue); (2) 
respondents were specifically instructed to disregard Meaningful Use payments; and (3) 
Physician Compare, did not constitute  a pay-for-performance program at the time of 
the survey. However, given the relatively early introduction of Physician Compare 
(2006), reverse-causality constitutes a greater threat in the context of our p blic 
reporting variable. 
 
Second, our main financial exposure variable is a function of two inputs –  (1) percentage 
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structures –  and thus our results reflect both practice experience and success with such 
schemes. Nonetheless, our alternative specification of any financial incentive (rather 
than percentage of revenue from incentives) remained strongly related to ACO 
participation and positively, albeit non-significantly, related to Meaningful Use. Third, 
we uncovered evidence that the presence of financial incentive outliers (i.e., those with 
at least 20 percent of revnue from financial incentives) was slightly biasing our results 
downward, and their exclusion shifted the marginal effect from approximately one- to 
one-and-a-half percentage-points. 
 
Finally, caution must be taken in generalizing our results. The influence of performance 
incentives on value-based reforms is likely context-dependent and depends on the exact 
nature of the incentives (e.g., bonus size, likelihood, and frequency), programs (e.g., 
incentivized measures, beneficiary population), and timing (e.g., early- versus late-
adoption) (Kronick, Casalino, and Bindman 2015; Wu et al. 2016). Although we seek to 
evaluate whether past exposure to incentives can encourage and facilitate participation 
in Medicare’s value-based reforms, these relationships will likely change as the scale and 
scope of ACOs, Physician Compare, and Meaningful Use evolve and are consolidated 
into the MIPS and APM payment pathways. These relationships are likely yet more 
complex in the context of commercial insurance, given the enormous diversity of ACOs, 
ACO-like programs, and other value-based initiatives offered by commercial payers. 
 
MACRA embodies the belief that financial incentives can motivate providers to 
participate in value-based reforms to improve quality and efficiency. Ince tives are not a 
panacea, nor are all incentives financial (Phipps-Taylor and Shortell 2016). Nonetheless, 
policy makers have at their disposal a very limited number of tools –  most prominently, 
money and information (Glied 2015). We find that experience responding to financial 
incentives and public reporting may powerfully enhace practices’ ability to join 
Medicare’s value-based payment reforms. These incentives have clear limits, however. 
The increased dependence on such external incentives as the sole instrument for 
systematic change necessitates careful consideration by all. There is likely need to 
consider a broad range of incentives to and assistance support to ensure systematic 
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Table  1. Descriptive  Characte ris tics  o f 1,278  Phys ic an  Practices  in  the  Study Sam ple , 20 13 
Characte ris tic 
Percen t o r  
Mean  (SD) 
Perfo rm ance  incen tives 
  Financial incentives for quality (some) 0.46 (0 .49) 
  Financial incentives for efficiency (some) 0.22 (0 .41) 
  Financial incentives for quality or efficiency (some) 0.64 (0 .74) 
  Financial incentives for quality (% revenue) 1.20 (4.30) 
  Financial incentives for efficiency (% revenue) 1.01 (4.04) 
  Financial incentives for quality or efficiency (% revenue) 2.20 (7.01) 
  Public reporting 0.45 (0 .50) 
Medicare  value-based ou tcom es 
Physician Compare participation (% of practices’ physicians) 0.48 (0 .45) a 
Meaningful Use participation (% of practices’ physicians) 0.48 (0 .45) a 
ACO participation (yes = 1, no = 0) 0 .15 (0 .36) 
ACO preparedness to implement Meaningful Use 3.32 (0 .91) b 
ACO preparedness to collect, analyze, report cost and quality data 3.12 (0 .83) b 
Practice  capabilities 
IPA/ PHO, significant share of patients (yes = 1, no = 0) 0 .18 (0 .38) 
Ownership  
Physician 0.83 (0 .38) 
Hospital or health system 0.13 (0 .34) 
Community health center 0 .04 (0 .20) 
Practice size (number of physicians) 24.97 (173.17) 
HMO (% revenue) 28.89 (26.81) 
Health information technology index 52.14 (27.85) c 
Patient-centered culture index 4.07 (0 .65) d 
Patien t facto rs 
Black (% share of patients) 15.91 (15.24) 
Limited English proficiency (% share of patients) 10.54 (19.93) 
Payer mix (% annual revenue)  
Medicare 36.26 (17.31) 
Medicaid or no insurance (low income) 13.08 (12.42) 
Other 10.24 (16.60) e 
Commercial 40.48 (20.32) 
aPhysician Compare and Meaningful Use participation rates were based on the 1,192 practices linked between NSPO 3 and Physician Compare 
Provider-Level National File. bACO preparedness was based on the 259 ACO practices and measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale with 1 = Not 
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elsewhere (McMenamin et al. 2010). dThe patient-centered culture index ranged from 1 to 5 based on average responses for items measured on a 
5-point Likert-type scale that captured the extent to which practices: assess patient needs and expectations; promptly resolved patient 
complaints; study patients’ complaints to identify patterns and prevent recurrence; use patient data to improve care; use data on patient 
expectations and/ or experiences when developing services. eOther insurance includes no insurance (if middle or high income) and other 
insurance. All analyses used weighted data. SD is standard deviation. ACO is accountable care organization. IPA is Independent Practice 
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Table  2 . Co rre lation  m atrix o f participation  in  Med icare ’s  value-based re fo rm s 
 
Program  ACO Physician Compare Meaningful Use 
ACO - - - 
Physician Compare 0.1722 - - 
Meaningful Use 0.1358 0.3736 - 
Participate rates were based on the 1,295 practices linked between the NSPO3 and the 2013 Physician Compare Provider-Level 
National File. This is a matrix of the Pearson correlation coefficients, where +1 represents a perfect positive correlation, 0  represents 
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Phys ician  Com pare 
a participation
Mean ingfu l Use 
b participation b 
Per fo r m a n ce  in cen t iv es  Average  m arginal e ffect o f incen tives  on  participation  (SE) 
    Financial incentives 
0.009 
(0.001)*** 




    Public reporting  0 .036 (0.014)*  
0 .120 
(0.026)*** 
 0 .136 (0.046)*** 
Pr a ct ice  ca p a b ilit ies        
  IPA/ PHO, significant share of patients 0 .106 (0.027)*** 0 .123 (0.032)** 0 .062 (0.046) 0 .022 (0.028) -0 .143 (0.062)** -0 .181 (0.090)** 
  Size (number of physicians) 0 .000 (0.000) 0 .000 (0.000) 0 .001 (0.000)* 0 .000 (0.000)* 0 .000 (0.000) 0 .000 (0.000) 





0 .001 (0.001) 0 .001 (0.001) 














0 .058 (0.033)* 0 .047 (0.031) -0 .026 (0.014)* -0 .035 (0.018)* 
  Ownership  d      
    Hospital or health system 0.001 (0.028) -0 .010 (0.031) 0 .002 (0.036) 0 .014 (0.032) 0 .173 (0.025)*** 0 .181 (0.027)*** 
    Community health center 0 .010 (0.039) 0 .006 (0.037) 0 .164 (0.11) 0 .208 (0.123)* 0 .166 (0.069)** 0 .207 (0.077)*** 
Pa t ien t  fa ct o r s        





0 .001 (0.000)** 
  Limited English proficiency (% patients) 0 .001 (0.000)** 0 .001 (0.000)* 0 .005 (0.001)** 
0 .005 
(0.001)*** 
0 .001(0.001) 0 .000 (0.000) 
  Payer mix (% revenue)  e      





0 .001 (0.001) 0 .001 (0.001) 
-0 .002 
(0.001)** 
-0 .002 (0.001)* 
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    Other insurance -0.001 (0.000)* -0 .001 (0.000) -0 .001 (0.001)* 
-0 .002 
(0.001)** 
-0 .001 (0.001)* -0 .002 (0.001)* 
Sample size n = 1,278 n = 1,278 n = 1,192 n = 1,192 n = 1,192 n = 1,192 
aProbit regression analysis was used for the ACO participation model. Average marginal effects derived from the probit regression were largely consistent with regression coefficients from the same 
model. bLinear regression analysis was used for the P ysician Compare and Meaningful Use analyses. cThe health information technology composite variable was excluded from the Meaningful Use 
model to avoid over-adjustment. dReference group is physician-owned. eReference group is commercial insurance. All analyses used weighted data. SE is standard error. ACO is accountable care 
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Figure  1. Average  m arginal e ffect o f financial incen tives  on  ACO preparedness  to  u tilize  
cos t and quality data 
 
Ordered probit analysis was conducted on the 259 NSPO3 practices that had applied to become a Medicare ACO. Each dot 
represents the average marginal effect of financial incentives on the likelihood of a practice reporting a specific level of preparedness. 
For example, for each additional one percentage point increase in financial incentives for cost or quality, there is about a 0 .7 
percentage point increased probability of a practice reporting that their ACO is “very well” to collect, analyze, and report cost and 
quality data. Average marginal effects derived from the ordered probit regression were largely consistent with regression coefficients 
from the same models. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. ACO is accountable care organization.  
A
u
th
o
r 
M
a
n
u
s
c
ri
p
t
hesr_12743_f1.tif
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
A
u
th
o
r 
M
a
n
u
s
c
ri
p
t
